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Saudi-Qatari relations during the period 1990-2003 and Their Point of View Against the Conflicts in Gulf Region

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Abstract

This study comes to cover the Saudi-Qatari relations during the period (1990-2003) and the events and attitudes that took place both at the regional and global levels, and their position on it. This study came to start a period of decisive measures to demarcate the borders between the two countries and the security breach between the two countries on the border post in Al-Khfous border in 1992. This study also came to show what took place in negotiations and from international mediations to solve the problems once and for all. The study also came to clarify the position of Saudi Arabia and Qatar regarding the Iraqi invasion in 1990 against Kuwait and the second Gulf war, the issue of Gulf security (national security - oil), and international and regional alliances to reduce this threat. This study clarifies the position of Saudi mediation to end the Qatari and Bahraini dispute over the "Hawar Islands", and discusses if the mediation have an effective role in ending the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain or not?

Keywords: Saudi-Qatari relations, international alliances, national security, Bahrain, Kuwait, Gulf war.

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Introduction

When talking about the Gulf-Israeli relations in general and the Saudi-Qatari-Israeli relations in particular, we find that there is a difference in opinions and a difference in views. Likewise, most of the time, reservations are made with regard to dealing with Israel or the commercial dealings (commercial offices). Initially, we will find that Saudi Arabia opposed and took the position of the opposition from other Gulf countries for its positive attitude towards Israel (Marhoon 1997, 1999). But will this negative relationship remain or will it change?

This study will answer these inquiries that were within the study period. Also, this study will talk about the media role of Al-Jazeera for the development of Saudi-Qatari relations, whether negatively or positively?

This study came to cover the relations between the two countries during the study period and tried to limit the most important major axes of research during the study (1990-2003).

1. The problem of the Saudi borders with Qatar:

The roots of relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are back since the beginning of the twentieth century in 1913 AD, where the Saudi state confirmed that Qatar and Oman are part of their territories, but Britain rejected this matter and stressed that the Saudi-Qatari border is defined in the Blue Line Agreement signed on July 29, 1913 between Britain and Ottoman state.

It was stated in the Daren Treaty of 1915 between Britain and Saudi Arabia that Saudi Arabia affirmed its respect for the borders of Qatar. At the Al-Aqeer Conference in 1922, the British political resident in the Persian Gulf (Percy Cox) made it clear to Saudi Arabia that Britain would address any transgression of the Saudi-Qatari border. And he drew a line for what the Saudi-Qatari border should be on, and this line was known as the line (Cox's Statement) and in the third decade of the twentieth century the problem of borders arose as part of the struggle for oil, and in September 1933 AD the Sheikh of Qatar signed an agreement with Ibn Saud pledging that No oil concession is granted in the internal lands of Qatar, and that it does not exceed the concessions granted by the city of Doha.

Britain found in the Saudi-Qatari agreement an entry for American companies and warned the Sheikh of Qatar that Ibn Saud was seeking to control Qatar and its interests. On May 17, 1935, the Sheikh of Qatar gave companies British concession to explore for oil, Ibn Saud insisted that companies should not be allowed to carry out exploration until clear borders were reached for the two countries and negotiations took place between Ibn Saud and Britain (as the protector of Qatar) throughout the period before the Second World War around the Saudi-Qatari border, but without a little result In 1945, negotiations between the two sides were resumed (Marhoon, 1997). In 1949 AD, Saudi Arabia presented a new vision of its borders with Qatar, and it was known (the Saudi line of 1949 AD), and its introduction meant the extraction of a piece of Qatari land 25 miles wide. In the year 1952 AD, the round-table conference was held in Dammam and was attended by representatives of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Britain, but the conference failed to reach a solution to the Saudi-Qatari conflict (as it failed to resolve the Saudi-Emirati conflict) (Marhoon, 1999). In 1965, a Saudi-Qatari agreement was signed, the terms of which were not announced, and it appears that he made a consensual choice between Saudi Arabia's demands for the year 1949 AD, and what Britain proved in 1955 (Hilal et al., 2005). However, of course he did not resolve all outstanding issues and did not end the conflict. In 1974, Saudi Arabia was able to obtain (Khor Al Adaid). The Al-Khafous area is located near the road leading to a small naval base recently built by Saudi Arabia in Khor Al-Adeed, which is a

small bay located in the south of Qatar. It was affiliated with the United Arab Emirates before it was ceded to Saudi Arabia as in the 1974 agreement. A commercial partner for it in the Arab Gulf region, and Qatar believes that Saudi control over this site makes all the land routes to Qatar completely surrounded by Saudi lands, and it must pass Saudi traffic points before reaching the Emirates. On September 30, 1992, Qatar announced an armed attack by a Saudi military unit on the Khfoss border post, according to the official account of Qatar, that two Qatari soldiers were killed, and another was captured. On the following day, Doha announced another Saudi attack and said that a large military force had surrounded the Qafous Al-Khfoss center and forced its remaining members to leave, and Riyadh had denied the Qatari version of events (Marhoon, 1997). A Saudi statement came in response to the incident that the fact of the incident is summarized in the occurrence of a firefight between Badia men inside Saudi soil.

The conflict appeared publicly over Al-Khfoss when Qatar issued a statement on September 30, 1992, in which it said: "A Saudi military force attacked the Qatari center of Al-Khfus, resulting in the death of two soldiers from the Qatari Armed Forces." In addition, except for the families of a third soldier, whom I accompanied on the following day with a statement, in which I said: "A large Saudi military force surrounded the Qatari center of Khufus and forced the remaining members at the center to leave and seized it." Immediately, the Qatari Council of Ministers held an emergency meeting chaired by the Crown Prince and Prime Minister Ahmed bin Khalifa, and the Council announced the suspension of the border agreement concluded between the two countries for the year 1965 AD, which does not include drawing and delineating the borders between the two countries once and for all, and the Qatari statement accused Saudi Arabia that it had recently sought to draw 70% of its borders with Qatar separately, in violation of the provisions of the said agreement. It did not respond to the demands of Qatar to hold direct talks to finalize the borders of the two countries in a final way to tighten it, especially the third and fifth articles from it, and that the Council took into account that Saudi Arabia had recently sought to demarcate the borders between the two countries separately in violation of the provisions of the aforementioned agreement and did not respond to the repeated requests of the State of Qatar to hold talks for this purpose (Al-Tamimi, 2012). As for the Saudi position, it was crystallized in a statement issued on October 1, 1992, in which it stated that the center of Al-Khfous was not subjected to a military attack, and that the truth of what happened was nothing but a firefight between members of the desert inside the Saudi borders. Which led to the killing of Qataris and a Saudi, and the statement rejected the Qatari cabinet's decision to suspend the agreement in 1965, and Saudi Arabia considered the agreement binding on the two parties and it is not permissible to breach it. Then Saudi Arabia issued another statement on the 14th of the same month in the same year in which it stated: Saudi Arabia is any center or site in the name of khfous and that the khfous site is located within the borders of Qatar and Saudi Arabia accused that Qatar took advantage of the kingdom's preoccupation with the events of the second Gulf war, and penetrated into Saudi territory an area of no less than 14 km. The statement that the joint technical committee subject to the delimitation of the borders between the two sides has ended its work, and only what remains is approval to choose the company that will set the boundary markers. The third article states that a global survey company is entrusted with carrying out a survey and determining the land and sea border points between the two countries. This map, after signing it, is the boundary map the official d between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and attached to the agreement in 1965 AD as an integral part of it. The fifth article provides for the formation of a joint technical committee, whose medicine is to prepare the specifications for the survey process, to clarify the border points between the two countries, and to supervise the implementation of the survey process.

Qatar resorted to several methods to pressure Saudi Arabia to withdraw from the captivity, and the most important of these methods:

- a. Exporting the conflict to the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Qatar announced its withdrawal from the Peninsula Shield Forces at a time when some of the GCC countries are calling for the development of these forces to be the nucleus of the national security of the Gulf.
- b. Qatar has boycotted the meetings of the ministers of the GCC states since the conflict began (the Khfous Border Center incident).
- c. Qatar restored diplomatic relations with Iraq, which led to Iraq declaring its support for the State of Qatar in its border dispute with Saudi Arabia, but soon the relationship between Qatar and Iraq ended.
- d. Qatari allusion to restore relations with Iran to gain Iranian support in its favor.
- e. Going towards the Security Council to play the role of mediation, and press Saudi Arabia to withdraw from the slave (Marhoon, 1997; Al-Tamimi, 2012).

In response, Saudi Arabia categorically rejected the Qatari decision, and Riyadh called on October 5, 1992 to implement the third article of the 1965 agreement, which stipulates a joint selection by the two countries for a specialized international company to carry out the process of setting border demarcations between the two countries. Several mediators have stepped in to reconcile Doha and Riyadh, but only Egyptian mediation ultimately managed to freeze the dispute between the two sides without being able, of course, to find a final solution to it. There is a legal controversy revolving around the basis on which the joint technical committee between the two countries was supposed to meet (Marhoon, 1997).

On June 7, 1999, the Joint Technical Committee finalized the maps of the demarcation of the land borders between the two countries and the demarcation of the boundary line. The two sides signed these maps after two and a half years of negotiations and meetings in Riyadh, Doha and Paris.

The head of the Saudi side in the Joint Border Technical Committee, Lieutenant General Marea bin Hassan Al-Shahrani, head of the Military Survey Department in the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, considered the demarcation of the borders between the two countries as a civilized mechanism to assist the efforts of the two countries to maintain their border security and clarify the parameters of each side's responsibility in controlling movement around a line Borders, indicating that this supports the security and stability of citizens and strengthens friendliness, brotherhood, and love.

The head of the Qatari side, Colonel Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Rumaihi, announced that the joint committee and the contracting company carried out the project of demarcating the borders on the ground by placing survey marks that were built to the terms of the contract and technical specifications. Francois Dosoir, regional director of «I.A.G »executing the project, thanks to this achievement for both sides, explaining that common difficulties faced everyone and overcame them and were rewarded with joint success as well, as they achieved positive results. He expressed his appreciation for giving him the opportunity to participate in this event and for the confidence given to the company in awarding this contract (Shehata, 1993). He explained that this project was a challenge for his company, and he said: The first step was to locate the border points and this was done with unexpected accuracy, and I used for that the latest technical and computational methods. Then we had to implement the cartographic work for the border area, and to define and locate each landmark in an accurate way, and this reason makes the accuracy of the map an axiom. He said: In this project, we used all the "cartographic" techniques. And he saw that the advantage of this project was not only in the technologies that were applied, but also in participating in working with two teams from the two

neighboring countries for one goal, which is the boundary line between them. Doswar explained that he has full conviction that setting a boundary line is not to differentiate but rather to bring together the parties concerned, pointing out that the joint border technical committee was formed of highly qualified officials from both countries to translate the political decision into practical and technical application (Middle East, 2001).

2. The problem of Iraqi invasion and Annexation of Kuwait :

An attack by the Iraqi army on Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The military operation lasted two days and ended with the seizure of Iraqi forces over the entire Kuwaiti lands on August 4, then a sham government was formed headed by Colonel Alaa Hussein during August 4-8 under the name of the Republic of Kuwait. Then the Iraqi government announced on August 9, 1990, Kuwait annexed to Iraq and the cancellation of all international embassies in Kuwait, along with the declaration of Kuwait 19th governorate for Iraq and the change of streets and establishments names, including changing the name of the Kuwaiti capital in Taif, Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti government was formed in exile where the Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah and Crown Prince Sheikh Saad Abdullah Al-Sabah and several ministers and members of the Kuwaiti armed forces. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait continued for a period of 7 months. The occupation ended with the liberation of Kuwait on February 26, 1991 after the second Gulf War.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came to represent a major challenge for the Gulf countries, as the invasion surprised the countries. And it posed an unprecedented security threat and this did not prevent the building of a unified Gulf position in its basic lines, where the Council carried out a kind of general mobilization of the available sources of power to confront the sources of the threat and helped it to do so because it was the most stable and complete grouping of its institutional structure compared to other Arab and regional groupings on the eve of the invasion (Al-Aidarous, 2002).

In 1990, this invasion was aimed at maximizing Iraqi gains at the expense of opponents, through interdependence between political, economic and military tools, where political behavior was aimed at ensuring that Iraq won the prize of all spoils by toughening, wasting time and freezing the issue. As for military and economic behavior, it was aimed at enabling Iraq of capabilities and ingredients which it can face the heavy pressures staring at Iraq (Barakat, 1992).

Consequently, the unified position and response among the Gulf Cooperation Council states came to the invasion, and here we can divide on several levels, the most important of which are:

The political level: The foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council carried out intensive diplomatic activity, on the sidelines of the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990.

During the first meeting of the Gulf ministers with the US Secretary of State, they agreed on the following:

- a. - The necessity of implementing all Security Council resolutions in all its aspects and that there is no such thing as a partial solution or a phased solution.
- b. - There is no compromise on the two basic conditions on which any peaceful endeavors depend, namely withdrawal and the return to legitimacy.
- c. - The two sides agreed to keep the door open for a diplomatic and political solution balanced with economic and psychological pressure and isolate Iraq internationally and regionally, in order to achieve these two conditions by peaceful means (Mahmoud, 1990).
- d. - The two parties stressed the importance of serious consideration of additional measures provided for in the United Nations Charter, in addition to more economic and political

sanctions such as cutting diplomatic ties and taking measures against diplomatic missions (Raslan, 1991).

Economic level: The Gulf states continued with each other to continue trading in Kuwaiti dinars, and agreed to harass Iraq economically, and to make the economic blockade more tightly for it, and to press that these decisions also be the Security Council resolution.

Security and defense level: The issue of internal and national security is receiving wide attention in the Gulf states due to the special circumstances, which are mainly due to the nature of the social and political systems of these countries on the other hand to the fragility of the population structure, which often depends on migrant workers of different nationalities Arab and non-Arab, in addition to these countries' fear of Iraq resorting to military attacks against it (Raslan, 1991).

2.1. The Saudi position on the invasion

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents the important base in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Kingdom seeks to play the role of the leading state and model state, that is to say, that Saudi politics is the axis around which the policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council is formed. Hence, it can be considered that the Gulf policy seeks to achieve three main goals:

- a. - The complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
- b. - The return of the Kuwaiti government to rule, in that it and the rest of the Gulf regimes are based on a single source of legitimacy.
- c. - Seek to lay the foundations for not repeating such a threat in the future.

From here, we can clarify Saudi Arabia's position to the following:

- In September 1990, Saudi Arabia restored full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, after a break that lasted for more than half a century. It also revitalized its relations with China with which it had reestablished relations with it a month before the invasion, while the United States has increased coordination and insurance with it for military pressure on Iraq. An agreement was reached on the leadership of the military forces in the event of an outbreak of operations and an agreement was made to conclude an arms deal with a total value of approximately \$ 21 billion (Al-Qasimi, 2014).

- In more than one position, Saudi Arabia announced its call and preference for a peaceful solution, in the context of withdrawal and the return of legitimacy, due to the Saudi leadership's awareness of the severe damage that the war can cause to the Saudi and Gulf economies in general.

Since the invasion, it has become clear that there is a phase of positive transformation of relations between Tehran and Riyadh, as Iran is the traditionally known regional power and that a balance can be struck toward Iraq. It can be said that the crisis contributed to crystallizing conviction among the Gulf states that it is not possible for one side in the Gulf, that it plays the role of controlling the affairs of the Gulf or the region, and participation and interaction are the most important ways to achieve cooperation. They help the Gulf-Iranian rapprochement, the position taken by Iran to condemn the invasion and its demand to implement Security Council resolutions and its firm declaration regarding any attempts to change the political geography of the region with the necessity of the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Al-Qasimi, 2014).

2.2. The Qatari position on the invasion:

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its consequences, which increased anxiety in Qatar as well as in small Gulf States, and that concern, was formed in Qatar in its geopolitical position between the two competing powers in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Iran. This means that it can be a victim of competition for geopolitics in the region, which witnessed the Iranian occupation of the three Emirati islands in the early seventies. Qatar has been keen to secure protection from the United States of America, and has even established diplomatic and trade relations with Israel, which means that looking after internal national affairs at the expense of regional security has exacerbated Gulf crises, specifically Saudi-Qatari and Bahraini-Qatari relations for example. In the same context, the Saudi press indicates that the withdrawal of the Saudi ambassador to Qatar in 2002 was not the result of a program on Al-Jazeera, but rather due to the nature of the two countries' relationship with the United States and Qatar's opening of a trade office with Israel, in addition to Saudi Arabia's refusal to war with Iraq while Qatar was And al-Adaid is the starting point for the American attack on Iraq (Abdelhay-Altamimi, 2014).

3. The Saudi position on the Bahraini-Qatari border dispute:

The Bahraini-Qatari border dispute dates back to 1937, when the Qatari forces attacked the area of Al-Zubara, which belonged to Bahrain, located within the Qatari peninsula in the northwestern part of it. According to Bahrain, Qatar was not satisfied with extracting Al Zubarah, the original headquarters of the Al Khalifa family, the ruling family in Bahrain, but rather sought to control the group of Hawar Islands, Fasht al-Dibel and other small islands belonging to Bahrain, which together make up a third of the area of Bahrain. In 1937, Britain, which was imposing its protection on large parts of the eastern shore of the Arabian Peninsula, interfered in the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, and the dispute was settled and the borders between them were demarcated. In April 1986 Qatar landed its forces on the Bahraini island of Fasht Al-Dibel (Fusht is a Persian word meaning flooded lands) which is located to the northeast of the main island of Bahrain, where it detained 29 employees and construction workers who were working on building a coast guard station. Saudi Arabia intervened, as its mediation led to the release of the detainees after 17 days and continued its mediation to contain the dispute (Karam, 2002). In a later period, Saudi Arabia succeeded in forming a tripartite committee headed by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin Abdulaziz and the membership of each of the former Emir of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa, and the former Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, aiming to search for an amicable solution to the dispute. In 1987, the parties agreed in principle to a framework of principles for a solution proposed by Saudi Arabia, which stipulated that if negotiations between the two parties did not succeed to reach a comprehensive agreement to settle the dispute, the two parties would conduct subsequent negotiations to determine the best way to reach a settlement through international law. Bahrain says that in 1990 Qatar took advantage of the Gulf summit held in Doha to discuss the issue of the invasion of Kuwait and succeeded in eliciting Bahrain's signature of an agreement based on the principles proposed by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, according to which Saudi Arabia had an opportunity to find a solution to the border dispute between the two countries provided that both parties are allowed By submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands (Marhoon, 1999). On July 8, 1991, armed with this agreement and without officially announcing the failure of Saudi mediation, Qatar went unilaterally to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands, the highest judicial authority within the framework of the United Nations. The court demanded support for its desire to declare Qatari sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, the two islands of Fasht Al-Dibel and the piece of Jaradah, and to re-demarcate the maritime boundaries separating the land bottles and the adherent waters belonging to them, both Qatar and Bahrain. In

1992, the dispute intensified between the two parties after the announcement of the former Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, that a decision would be set to limit the territorial waters of his country by 44.4 km, which meant the inclusion of about 10 islands under Bahraini sovereignty within the Qatari borders. The International Court of Justice has set the date of September 28, 1992 for Qatar to submit its documents to the court, and has set the next day September 29, 1992 as the date for Bahrain to submit its documents. In July 1994, the International Court issued a ruling on the existing dispute over its jurisdiction and its acceptance to consider the issue of defining maritime borders and territorial issues between the two countries. Where the court accepted the Bahraini version requesting consideration of all points of disagreement, which numbered five, namely:

1- Hawar Islands 2- Fasht Al-Dibel and Ain Jarada 3- Archipelago baselines 4- Al-Zubarah 5- Pearl herat, swimming pools and other issues related to maritime borders. The court set November 30, 1994 as a deadline for the parties to submit all points of dispute and its aspects to the court, after having completely dismissed this consideration of the individual Qatari application. In April 1998, Bahrain filed an appeal with 82 documents submitted by Qatar to the court, on the basis that it found fraudulent in terms of seals and inks and the type of papers used and submitted by Qatar to support its case against Bahrain. In February 1999, the court formally registered Qatar's abandonment of documents that had been found to be forged.

On May 29, 2000 verbal arguments for the case began in The Hague. In June 2000, the oral arguments of the two parties ended before the International Court, pending the issuance of the ruling (Marhoon, 2001).

In December 1996, when the Gulf Summit held in Muscat chose Sheikh Jamil Al-Hujailan as Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council in exchange for the candidate of Qatar at the time Abdul Rahman Al-Attiyah - the former Secretary-General - the Emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa protested this and boycotted the closing session of the Muscat Gulf Summit in that Time. What added to the crisis was the unsuccessful coup attempt on the current emir that his father arranged for the previous prince Sheikh Khalifa to seek re-rule after his son's coup against him in 1995, even though the father prince - the former ruler - arranged the attempt while he was in Abu Dhabi and hired two Qatari followers who were present in Abu Dhabi and others inside Qatar, however, Doha considered that some of the Saudi parties had a hand in this attempt, and from here the real crisis began, which witnessed many problems and Qatar used the media and financially supported it against Saudi Arabia (Marhoon, 2016).

4. Al-Jazeera's media role: Relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar:

Al-Jazeera was established in November 1996, when its construction order was issued by the Emir of the State of Qatar. The date of the establishment of the Al-Jazeera channel dates back to the date of the collapse of the agreement between the Radio and Television Corporation of Orbit and the Arab section of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which is related to the establishment of a television station after the overwhelming success of the radio station of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which broadcasts its programs in Arabic, which succeeded in attracting about 14 million listeners in 1994. However, this success was not achieved in the television field, and the reason for breaking the agreement was the British-Saudi dispute over the area of freedom that could be allowed in the field of media coverage and the nature of issues and issues that can be covered causing the breakdown of this agreement, in the loss of 20 of the best Arab media professionals This reason encouraged the establishment of a modern channel, which is the island that attracted these prominent, qualified and trained media professionals at the highest level of skill and craftsmanship, and became the nucleus of the integrated structure in the Al-Jazeera channel (Judges, 2008). When

we talk about the Qatari-Saudi relations, we must talk about the media role, especially the role of Al-Jazeera, and it is first to say that Al-Jazeera is the true expression of the industry of the Saudi-Qatari crisis for Saudi Arabia at the international level, on the other hand.

The Qatari position on Iran and Iraq is one of the causes of the differences with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and the differences have negatively affected the joint economic projects in the region, especially the agreement to establish the Gulf market. Qatar wanted Iran to be a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and represented the Gulf War in 1991 An important stop that prompted the Gulf states to develop their internal national security at the expense of regional security. As an expression of the Qatari-Saudi political tension, the island attacked the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the ruling family in more than one place, the most important of which was the crisis caused by the opposite direction program on June 25, 2002 about Saudi Arabia and the relationship with the Palestinian cause, after which, after three weeks, the program "more than one opinion" which was titled: The popular position on the American campaigns against Saudi Arabia, where he hosted the Saudi opposition program, Mohsen Al-Auji, who criticized Prince Abdullah, the Saudi crown prince at the time, and despite the seriousness of the American criticism of Saudi Arabia and political analysts deliberating on an American project to divide Saudi Arabia into three regions. However, Al-Jazeera was content to address the issue from a side completely different from the nature of the crisis, which reflects Al-Jazeera's endeavor to engage its Arab audience, given what it perceives as important, despite the presence of what is more dangerous and important, i.e. coverage on the rising American-Qatari relations that culminated in building the "many" American base That was the center of the invasion of Iraq (Al-Gosaibi et al., 2002). Al-Jazeera's coverage of Osama bin Laden's recordings and the reactions and disclosures of the September 11 events that accompanied new information, specifically the "Top Secret" program presented by YusriFouda, made the channel an international media phenomenon that requires stopping by the Western media, which presented excerpts from His own coverage, but the reaction of American diplomacy to these coverage, was towards Saudi Arabia, the first source of the majority of the participants in the September 11 attacks, and because of it the American view of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has shifted from an ally and friend to a strategic enemy, and at that time I voted the Zionist lobby and press pens calling to occupy oil areas and freeze Saudi assets in the United States. "The New York Times reported on October 13, 2001, that Saudi Arabia tolerates terrorism and that political repression encourages destructive habits, but the main beneficiary of the tension of these relations is Qatar in particular. Because of it, Qatar was able to become the first ally of the United States in the Arab region (Al-Gosaibi et al., 2002).

Based on the foregoing, it can be said that Al Jazeera's coverage of Saudi news represented a process of media fabrication, which relied on research in history and an attempt to create new gaps to approach historical events in a manner commensurate with the new facts, with the aim of communicating messages that Saudi Arabia is the largest Arab country responsible for the crises in The Arab region and specifically the occupation of Palestine through its relations with the Americans and hosting their military bases in a sacred Islamic place, so exploiting the religious symbol is a strategy from the island's strategies. Before Al-Jazeera, Saudi Arabia was in control of the Arab media space through the ART, MBC networks, but the presence of the island and the size of raging and emotional display in its speech, in addition to its news specialization, diminished the influence of Saudi private channels, and the name of Qatar began to pop up in the place of Saudi Arabia. Thus, Al-Jazeera made it possible for Qatar to emerge and impose itself on the regional scene. It helped reduce the influence of Saudi Arabia and its presence on Arab issues, making Qatar the ally and holder of American concessions in the Gulf (Al-Gosaibi et al., 2002).

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